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III. SB 2 TAKES POWER WHICH CONSTITUTIONALLY 
IS VESTED IN THE UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ASSIGNS THAT POWER 
TO A STATE AGENCY AND PRIVATE PARTIES 
Plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of certain features of SB 2, 
an omnibus education bill. These constitutionally questionable features are as 
follows. SB 2fs so-called "Textbook Approval Program" delegates certain 
textbook alignment functions to private parties and, in section 11 on page 17, 
expressly forbids the Utah State Board of Education ("USBE") from involvement 
in tasks associated with those functions. See, "Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Opening 
Brief ("Plaintiffs' Opening Brief), at pages 16-17. SB 2's so-called "Teacher 
Salary Supplement Program," which provides salary enhancements for qualifying 
teachers, gives discretionary power to the Utah Department of Human Resource 
Management (UDHRM) in allocating these benefits. Given the UDHRM's 
statutory structure, this legislative assignment excludes the USBE from playing 
decision-making or supervisory roles in this allocation of benefits. See, Plaintiffs' 
Opening Brief, at pages 14-16. The evidence submitted to the lower court on 
these points showed that the Utah State Legislature, in enacting SB 2, deliberately 
stripped the USBE of alignment responsibilities in the Textbook Approval 
Program because this had become politically controversial, see, Plaintiffs' Opening 
Brief, Appendix D, and that both of these areas of administrative implementation, 
textbook alignments and the allocation of benefits to teachers, traditionally have 
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been performed, as core functions, by the USBE, see, Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, at 
pages 13-14 and Appendix C. 
Utah's Constitution, in Article 5, Section 1, expressly provides for a 
separation of powers among the different branches of state government. This 
Court recently described the separation of powers as '"a bulwark against tyranny.'" 
Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2,162 & n. 46, _ P.3d _ (2012), citing United 
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965). One articulation of this doctrine, with 
application here, is that the Legislature, when passing laws, may not take power 
which constitutionally is vested in a constitutionally established department of 
government and give that power to another executive agency. See, e.g., Allen v. 
Rampton, 463 P.2d 7 (Utah 1969) (state treasurer's office); State v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 79 P.2d 25, 38 (Utah 1938) (state tax commission). 
Plaintiffs do not argue that the USBE is a fourth branch of our state's 
government. They merely aver that the USBE, as one of several executive 
departments, has been constitutionally vested, in Article 10, Section 3, with 
specified powers. This vesting, in turn, imposes a limitation upon the Legislature; 
lawmakers may not remove these powers from the USBE and give them to another 
agency or private parties. This same argument has been sustained by this Court in 
an unbroken chain of judicial precedents, stretching from 1898, two years after 
statehood, to the present, in opinions involving the Utah State Treasurer's Office, 
the Utah State Board of Examiners, the Utah State Board of Pardons, the Utah 
State Tax Commission, and the Utah State Attorney General. See, Plaintiffs' 
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Opening Brief, at pages 20-30. This argument acquires additional force, 
moreover, where, as here, power is taken from an elective, and, hence, politically 
accountable constitutional office and assigned to an un-elected, appointed agency 
head or, worse, private parties. See, Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, at pages 21-22 & n. 
2. 
The Legislature and the Attorney General largely (if not completely) ignore 
these precedents, attempting to divert attention with irrelevant arguments. They 
imply that plaintiffs are claiming that the Legislature does not have plenary 
authority to make laws which establish and maintain the public education system 
in our state, contrary to the language found in Utah Constitution, Article 10, 
Section 1. But plaintiffs make no such claim. They acknowledge that the 
Legislature not only is authorized but also is required to establish and maintain 
Utah's educational programs, including those bearing upon textbook alignments 
and teacher salaries. Plaintiffs' argument, consistent with the case law cited in 
their opening brief, as well as the provisions of Article 10, Section 3, is that, once 
those programs have become law, they must remain subject to the "general control 
and supervision" of the USBE. That case law, quoted extensively in Plaintiffs' 
Opening Brief, expressly states that this constitutional vesting in effect is a 
limitation on the Legislature's prerogatives. SB 2's provisions which are at issue 
in this case transgress those constitutional boundaries because they affirmatively 
divest the USBE of the powers of control and supervision vouchsafed to it under 
Article 10, Section 3. 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Attorney General insists that this divestiture of power is permissible 
because the Textbook Approval Program and the Teacher Salary Supplement 
Program do not implicate "core" functions of the USBE. But this claim fails for at 
least three reasons. 
First, according to this Court, "general control and supervision," as used in 
Article 10, Section 3, means "the direction and management of all aspects of [the] 
operation or business [of public education]." Utah School Boards v. State Bd. of 
Educ, 17 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Utah 2001) (emphasis in original). The Court called 
this "plenary" power. Id. at 1130, quoting In re Woodward, 384 P.2d 110, 112 
(Utah 1963). Because Article 10, Section 3, as interpreted by Utah School 
Boards, says that power to control and supervise all aspects of public education 
shall be exercised by the USBE, the Attorney General's "core ~ non-core" 
distinction is immaterial. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that "all" means "all," a 
term which does not admit of division into something "core" or less than "all." 
Second, the precedents cited at pages 20-30 of Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, 
consistent with the analysis found in Utah School Boards, do not make any 
distinction between core and non-core powers which may be vested 
constitutionally in any particular executive department. This distinction, in other 
words, does not appear to have constitutional significance insofar as this branch of 
Utah's non-delegation doctrine is concerned. Indeed, this limitation on legislative 
power has been held to apply even where the administrative chore at issue might 
be characterized as ministerial or non-essential. See, e.g., Uintah State Bank v. 
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Ajax, 297 P. 434 (Utah 1931) discussed at pages 22-25 of Plaintiffs' Opening 
Brief: 
Third, even if the distinction between core and non-core functions does 
have any constitutional significance in this context, the only evidence in this 
proceeding shows that the textbook alignments and teacher salaries in question are 
core functions of the USBE. See, Plaintiffs1 Opening Brief, at pages 13-14 and 
Appendix C. 
The Legislature attempts to backstop the Attorney General's core vs. non-
core argument, insofar as the Textbook Approval Program is concerned, by 
drawing a negative inference from the repeal of former Utah Constitution, Article 
10, Section 9, a provision which held that neither the Utah State Legislature nor 
the USBE should have power to prescribe text books for use in common schools. 
The Legislature's negative inference from repeal of Article 10, Section 9, is that 
USBE has no general control or supervision in the realm of textbook vetting, but 
that the Legislature has plenary power in this area and hence may pass laws such 
as that portion of the Textbook Approval Program which stripped the USBE of 
power in connection with the mapping and alignment of textbooks. Plaintiffs 
respectfully disagree and do not believe that the repeal of former Article 10, 
Section 9, supports this one-sided inference. Repeal was designed to release both 
the Legislature (in the exercise of its lawmaking powers) and the USBE (in the 
exercise of its administrative functions) from prior restraints. What is more, as 
noted in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at page 46 & n. 21, the repeal of former Article 
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10, Section 9, dovetails with constitutional changes which made membership on 
the USBE elective, non-partisan, and accountable to the public, showing that the 
Board now could be trusted to deal with matters of textbook administration. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Sections 19, 20, and 11 of SB 2, the so-called Teacher Salary Supplement 
Program and Textbook Approval Program, are unconstitutional. Both programs, 
as established in SB 2, violate the non-delegation doctrine as that principle of 
constitutional law has been applied on numerous occasions by this Court. They 
provide that another agency, the UDHRM, and private parties shall administer 
programs, the general control and supervision of which are constitutionally 
committed to the USBE under Article 10, Section 3. The Textbook Approval 
Program suffers from the additional constitutional defect of delegating 
government power to a private party. Accordingly, plaintiffs respectfully request 
that the Court vacate the lower court's order which denied summary judgment to 
plaintiffs and granted summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiffs further 
respectfully request that the Court remand the case to the lower court with 
instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. 
Dated this 21st day of February, 2012. 
^
 (
^ Q ^ 
Alan L. Smith 
1169 East 4020 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801)262-0555 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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